Selective information disclosure in contests

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

3 Scopus citations

Abstract

Contests are important mechanisms to elicit work (ideas) from crowds. While contests have been used throughout history (e.g. the British government's 1714 Longitude Prize), they have gained popularity in the current Internet era, and, in particular, in the context of crowdsourcing [2, 7, 14, 41, 59, 60].Well known examples include the Netflix prize (netflixprize.com), Darpa challenges [3, 57] and the Hult prize (hultprize.org), as well as various public platforms that allow requesters to solicit contributions through contests with monetary prizes, such as taskCN (www.taskcn.com), TopCoder (www.topcoder.com) and Kaggle (www.kaggle.com). As such, the study and analysis of contests have become prominent in mechanism design and multi-agent systems literature [6, 14, 23, 36-39, 43, 54]. These include both the analysis and determination of optimal strategies - for the contestants, and methods for the design of effective contests - for the contest's organizer. In this work we concentrate on the latter issue - that of contest design.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2019
PublisherInternational Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)
Pages2093-2095
Number of pages3
ISBN (Electronic)9781510892002
StatePublished - 2019
Event18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2019 - Montreal, Canada
Duration: 13 May 201917 May 2019
https://dl.acm.org/doi/proceedings/10.5555/3306127

Publication series

NameProceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS
Volume4
ISSN (Print)1548-8403
ISSN (Electronic)1558-2914

Conference

Conference18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2019
Country/TerritoryCanada
CityMontreal
Period13/05/1917/05/19
Internet address

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
This research was partially supported by the Israel SCIENCE FOUNDATION grant No. 1162/17.

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Selective information disclosure in contests'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this