Secure set intersection with untrusted hardware tokens

Marc Fischlin, Benny Pinkas, Ahmad Reza Sadeghi, Thomas Schneider, Ivan Visconti

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

24 Scopus citations


Secure set intersection protocols are the core building block for a manifold of privacy-preserving applications. In a recent work, Hazay and Lindell (ACM CCS 2008) introduced the idea of using trusted hardware tokens for the set intersection problem, devising protocols which improve over previous (in the standard model of two-party computation) protocols in terms of efficiency and secure composition. Their protocol uses only a linear number of symmetrickey computations and the amount of data stored in the token does not depend on the sizes of the sets. The security proof of the protocol is in the universal composability model and is based on the strong assumption that the token is trusted by both parties. In this paper we revisit the idea and model of hardware-based secure set intersection, and in particular consider a setting where tokens are not necessarily trusted by both participants to additionally cover threats like side channel attacks, firmware trapdoors and malicious hardware. Our protocols are very efficient and achieve the same level of security as those by Hazay and Lindell for trusted tokens. For untrusted tokens, our protocols ensure privacy against malicious adversaries, and correctness facing covert adversaries.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationTopics in Cryptology - CT-RSA 2011 - The Cryptographers' Track at the RSA Conference 2011, Proceedings
Number of pages16
StatePublished - 2011
Event11th Cryptographers' Track at the RSA Conference 2011: Topics in Cryptology, CT-RSA 2011 - San Francisco, CA, United States
Duration: 14 Feb 201118 Feb 2011

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume6558 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349


Conference11th Cryptographers' Track at the RSA Conference 2011: Topics in Cryptology, CT-RSA 2011
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CitySan Francisco, CA

Bibliographical note

Place of conference:San Francisco, CA, USA


  • cryptographic protocols
  • set intersection
  • untrusted hardware


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