Scoring rules: An alternative parameterization

Eyal Baharad, Shmuel Nitzan

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

4 Scopus citations


This note presents an alternative parameterization of any scoring rule that satisfies the score-expansion property. This parameterization is based on the vector that specifies, for every number of alternatives k, k ≤ 3, the minimal size of a coalition that can veto an alternative which is preferred by everybody outside the coalition. Our result sheds new light on the commonly used plurality and Borda rules, as well as the inverse plurality rule and any "vote for t alternatives rule".

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)187-190
Number of pages4
JournalEconomic Theory
Issue number1
StatePublished - Jan 2007


  • Minimal size of veto coalition
  • Parameterization
  • Score-expansion property
  • Scoring rules


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