Scepticism at the Service of Revelation? Preliminary Observations on Logic and Epistemology in Judah Halevi’s Kuzari: preliminary observations on logic and epistemology in Judah Halevi's Kuzari

How we should define scepticism is a fascinating question. Depending on differing definitions, we will arrive at different conclusions as to who can or cannot be characterized as sceptic. However, whether our answer to this fundamental enquiry be wide or narrow, inclusive or exclusive, casting doubt is clearly at its base.1According to the logical and epistemological Islamic-Aristotelian tradition, the distinction between arguments whose conclusions are certain and arguments whose conclusions are uncertain depends on the distinction between demonstrative arguments on the one hand and dialectical and rhetorical arguments on the other.2 While demonstrative arguments are indeed accepted as certain, dialectical and rhetorical ones are bound to be doubtful to some degree. These epistemological distinctions between what is necessary and what is possible and what is certain and what is convincing or merely satisfactory were laid down by Aristotle and his commentators.