Abstract
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) is a central cryptographic task that allows a set of mutually distrustful parties to jointly compute some function of their private inputs where security should hold in the presence of a malicious adversary that can corrupt any number of parties. Despite extensive research, the precise round complexity of this “standard-bearer” cryptographic primitive is unknown. Recently, Garg, Mukherjee, Pandey and Polychroniadou, in EUROCRYPT 2016 demonstrated that the round complexity of any MPC protocol relying on black-box proofs of security in the plain model must be at least four. Following this work, independently Ananth, Choudhuri and Jain, CRYPTO 2017 and Brakerski, Halevi, and Polychroniadou, TCC 2017 made progress towards solving this question and constructed four-round protocols based on non-polynomial time assumptions. More recently, Ciampi, Ostrovsky, Siniscalchi and Visconti in TCC 2017 closed the gap for two-party protocols by constructing a four-round protocol from polynomial-time assumptions. In another work, Ciampi, Ostrovsky, Siniscalchi and Visconti TCC 2017 showed how to design a four-round multi-party protocol for the specific case of multi-party coin-tossing. In this work, we resolve this question by designing a four-round actively secure multi-party (two or more parties) protocol for general functionalities under standard polynomial-time hardness assumptions with a black-box proof of security.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2018 - 38th Annual International Cryptology Conference, 2018, Proceedings |
Editors | Alexandra Boldyreva, Hovav Shacham |
Publisher | Springer Verlag |
Pages | 488-520 |
Number of pages | 33 |
ISBN (Print) | 9783319968803 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 2018 |
Event | 38th Annual International Cryptology Conference, CRYPTO 2018 - Santa Barbara, United States Duration: 19 Aug 2018 → 23 Aug 2018 |
Publication series
Name | Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) |
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Volume | 10992 LNCS |
ISSN (Print) | 0302-9743 |
ISSN (Electronic) | 1611-3349 |
Conference
Conference | 38th Annual International Cryptology Conference, CRYPTO 2018 |
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Country/Territory | United States |
City | Santa Barbara |
Period | 19/08/18 → 23/08/18 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2018, International Association for Cryptologic Research.
Funding
The first author was supported by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and Army Research Office(ARO) under Contract No. W911NF-15-C-0236. The second author was supported by the BIU Center for Research in Applied Cryptography and Cyber Security in conjunction with the Israel National Cyber Bureau in the Prime Minister’s Office. The third author was supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. 1617676, 1526377 and 1618884, IBM under Agreement 4915013672 and the Packard Foundation under Grant 2015-63124. The last author was supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. 1526377 and 1618884, a Google Faculty Research grant and DIMACS Special Focus on Cryptography program. The work was partially done while the fourth author was at Cornell Tech. We thank the anonymous reviewers for their valuable feedback. Following Ananth et. al. [ACJ17], we would like to acknowledge Yuval Ishai’s contribution in the three-bit three-round multiplication protocol employed in this work. We would also like to thank Daniel Genkin, Yuval Ishai and Mor Weiss for several discussions on binary AMD resilient circuits. The first author was supported by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and Army Research Office(ARO) under Contract No. W911NF-15-C-0236. The second author was supported by the BIU Center for Research in Applied Cryptography and Cyber Security in conjunction with the Israel National Cyber Bureau in the Prime Minister’s Office. The third author was supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. 1617676, 1526377 and 1618884, IBM under Agreement 4915013672 and the Packard Foundation under Grant 2015-63124. The last author was supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. 1526377 and 1618884, a Google Faculty Research grant and DIMACS Special Focus on Cryptography program. The work was partially done while the fourth author was at Cornell Tech. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense, the National Science Foundation, or the U.S. Government.
Funders | Funder number |
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National Science Foundation | 1526377, 1617676, 1618884 |
David and Lucile Packard Foundation | 2015-63124 |
Army Research Office | |
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency | W911NF-15-C-0236 |
International Business Machines Corporation | 4915013672 |
Keywords
- Additive errors
- Garbled circuits
- Round complexity
- Secure multi-party computation