Robustness against inefficient manipulation

Eyal Baharad; Zvika Neeman

doi:10.1007/s00355-006-0197-9

Robustness against inefficient manipulation

Eyal Baharad
, Zvika Neeman

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

This paper identifies a family of scoring rules that are robust against coalitional manipulations that result in inefficient outcomes. We discuss the robustness of a number of Condorcet consistent and "point runoff" voting rules against such inefficient manipulation and classify voting rules according to their potential vulnerability to inefficient manipulation.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	55-67
Number of pages	13
Journal	Social Choice and Welfare
Volume	29
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0197-9
State	Published - Jul 2007
Externally published	Yes

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Robustness against inefficient manipulation

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