Reward offered, no questions asked: An analysis of rewarded theft

Eliakim Katz, Jacob Rosenberg

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    1 Scopus citations


    The legal owner of a stolen good generally puts a higher value on that good than does the thief. There are therefore potential gains from trade between a legal owner and a successful thief. However, by trading with a thief, the legal owner is encouraging theft for 'ransom'. Should then negotiations between legal owners and thieves be outlawed? In this paper we suggest a framework for answering this question. We find that allowing such negotiations to take place may enhance the ex ante expected utility of owners.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)501-506
    Number of pages6
    Issue number283
    StatePublished - Aug 2004


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