Responsibility and Frankfurt-type Examples

David Widerker

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review


This article examines recent attempts to strengthen Frankfurt's argument against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) by providing better examples of FR-situations. It considers these examples from a libertarian viewpoint and argues that they do not succeed either. Even if at one point a defender of Frankfurt might be able to come up with a genuine example of an FR-situation, avoidability would still remain a necessary condition for at least one important type of moral responsibility-that of moral blameworthiness. In the course of defending this last claim, the article defends a more comprehensive constraint on moral blameworthiness than avoidability, and then applies this constraint to meet a well-known recent objection to PAP by John Fischer.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationThe Oxford Handbook of Free Will
PublisherOxford University Press
ISBN (Electronic)9780199995462
ISBN (Print)0195178548, 9780195178548
StatePublished - 2 Sep 2009

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2002 by Robert Hilary Kane. All rights reserved.


  • Avoidability
  • John fischer
  • Moral blameworthiness
  • Moral responsibility
  • Principle of alternative possibilities


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