Resilient Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods

Dolev Mutzari, Yonatan Aumann, Sarit Kraus

Research output: Contribution to journalConference articlepeer-review

Abstract

Fair allocation of indivisible goods has been studied extensively. However, the solutions offered to date are not resilient to subsequent changes that may occur after the allocation has been decided and executed, e.g., agents leaving the system, or additional goods are discovered. Currently, such settings require rerunning the allocation algorithm from scratch, potentially shifting most allocated goods between the agents. This can be cumbersome at best, or impossible at worst. In this paper, we study the notion of resilience, which quantifies the number of changes needed to resolve subsequent changes in the environment. We then apply it to the problem of fair allocation of indivisible goods, focusing on the EF1 and EFX solution concepts. For the EF1 solution concept, we provide constructive and efficient algorithms to restore EF1 after a simultaneous loss of goods, addition of new goods, and resignation of agents. We show that the addition of new agents cannot be resolved efficiently when the agents' valuation may be arbitrary. When agents have identical valuations, we show how to accept new agents efficiently. For the EFX solution concept, we (mostly) prove negative results, establishing that restoring EFX may be prohibitively costly, even for agents with identical valuations.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)2688-2690
Number of pages3
JournalProceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS
Volume2023-May
StatePublished - 2023
Event22nd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2023 - London, United Kingdom
Duration: 29 May 20232 Jun 2023

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2023 International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (www.ifaamas.org). All rights reserved.

Funding

This research has been partly supported by the Israel Science Foundation under grant 1958/20 and the EU Project TAILOR under grant 952215.

FundersFunder number
European Commission952215
Israel Science Foundation1958/20

    Keywords

    • Allocation
    • EF1
    • EFX
    • Fairness
    • Heterogeneous Preferences
    • Indivisible Goods
    • Multi-Agent Systems
    • Resilience

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