Research and Development with Stock-Dependent Spillovers and Price Competition in a Duopoly

This paper investigates the research and development accumulation and pricing strategies of two firms competing for consumer demand in a dynamic framework. AÂÂfirm’s research and development is production-cost-reducing and can benefit from part of the competitor’s research and development stock without payment. We consider decisions in a game characterized by Nash equilibrium. In this dynamic game, a player’s action depends on whether the competitor’s current research and development stock are observable. If the competitor’s current research and development stock are not observable or observable only after a certain time lag, a player’s action can be solely based on the information on the current period t (open-loop strategy). In the converse case, it can also include the information on the competitor’s reaction to a change in the current value of the state vector (closed-loop strategy), which allows for strategic interaction to take place throughout the game. Given the cumulative nature of research and development activities, a primary goal of this paper is to determine whether, regardless of the observability of the competitor’s current research and development stock, free research and development spillovers generate a lower level of scientific knowledge than research and development appropriability. AÂÂsecond objective of the paper is to determine how the observability of the rival’s current research and development stock affects a firm’s research and development and pricing decisions and payoffs under imperfect research and development appropriability.