Rent-seeking for pure public goods

Eliakim Katz, Shmuel Nitzan, Jacob Rosenberg

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

171 Scopus citations

Abstract

In this paper we present a formal analysis of rent-seeking for public goods by two or more groups with different numbers of individuals. We begin by considering equally wealthy groups under risk neutrality, a case which constitutes our basic model. Several surprising and interesting results emerge from the analysis of this basic case. The problem is then extended to deal with (a) groups with different wealth levels, and (b) risk aversion. This last extension brings about a further crop of interesting and useful results.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)49-60
Number of pages12
JournalPublic Choice
Volume65
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Apr 1990

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