Abstract
The public- choice school was the originator of the view in the modern economics literature that incentives of self- interest apply in all human behavior, including personal behavior of political decision- makers and government bureaucrats, as well as individuals, groups, and corporations seeking favors from government. Rents are akin to favors or gifts; if it is known that political decision- makers and government bureaucrats are prone to exercise discretion in assigning rents, and if the privileged favors that provide the rents are contestable, it is in the self- interest of prospective beneficiaries of the rents to contest the rents. The time, effort, initiative, and resources used in contesting rents are lost to productive contribution to a society's output. A social loss is therefore incurred because of rent seeking. The focus of the rent- seeking literature has been on evaluating the magnitude of the social loss.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | The Elgar Companion to Public Choice, Second Edition |
Publisher | Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. |
Pages | 307-330 |
Number of pages | 24 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9781849806039 |
ISBN (Print) | 9781849802857 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 1 Jan 2013 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© Michael Reksulak, Laura Razzolini and William F. Shughart II 2013. All rights reserved.