Reduced prizes and increased effort in contests

Gil S. Epstein; Shmuel Nitzan

doi:10.1007/s00355-005-0037-3

Reduced prizes and increased effort in contests

Centre for Economic Policy Research, London
IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

13 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study the general class of two-player public-policy contests and specify the asymmetry condition under which a more restrained government intervention that reduces the contestants' prizes has the "perverse" effect of increasing their aggregate lobbying efforts.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	447-453
Number of pages	7
Journal	Social Choice and Welfare
Volume	26
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-005-0037-3
State	Published - Jun 2006

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Reduced prizes and increased effort in contests

Abstract

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