Abstract
We report on the centralization of a two-sided matching-with-contracts market, in which pre-existing choice functions violate the substitutes condition. The ability to accommodate these choice functions was critical for the success of our design. The new mechanism is stable and strategy-proof for applicants. It is well accepted by both sides of the market. Our study provides a strong empirical validation for the practical relevance of recent theoretical advances on matching without substitutes.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 205-209 |
| Number of pages | 5 |
| Journal | American Economic Review |
| Volume | 107 |
| Issue number | 5 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - May 2017 |
Bibliographical note
Funding Information:We thank Leon Deouell, Scott Kominers, Déborah Marciano, Al Roth, and Tayfun Sönmez for helpful discussions and suggestions. We thank the faculty and administrative staff of departments of psychology in Israel for their cooperation throughout the process. Hassidim is supported by ISF grant 1241/12. Romm is supported by a Falk Institute grant and ISF grant 1780/16.
Funding
We thank Leon Deouell, Scott Kominers, Déborah Marciano, Al Roth, and Tayfun Sönmez for helpful discussions and suggestions. We thank the faculty and administrative staff of departments of psychology in Israel for their cooperation throughout the process. Hassidim is supported by ISF grant 1241/12. Romm is supported by a Falk Institute grant and ISF grant 1780/16.
| Funders | Funder number |
|---|---|
| Falk Institute | 1780/16 |
| Israel Science Foundation | 1241/12 |