Redesigning the Israeli psychology Master's match

Avinatan Hassidim, Assaf Romm, Ran I. Shorrer

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

18 Scopus citations


We report on the centralization of a two-sided matching-with-contracts market, in which pre-existing choice functions violate the substitutes condition. The ability to accommodate these choice functions was critical for the success of our design. The new mechanism is stable and strategy-proof for applicants. It is well accepted by both sides of the market. Our study provides a strong empirical validation for the practical relevance of recent theoretical advances on matching without substitutes.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)205-209
Number of pages5
JournalAmerican Economic Review
Issue number5
StatePublished - May 2017

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
We thank Leon Deouell, Scott Kominers, Déborah Marciano, Al Roth, and Tayfun Sönmez for helpful discussions and suggestions. We thank the faculty and administrative staff of departments of psychology in Israel for their cooperation throughout the process. Hassidim is supported by ISF grant 1241/12. Romm is supported by a Falk Institute grant and ISF grant 1780/16.


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