Abstract
The final step in getting an Israeli MD is performing a year-long internship in one of the hospitals in Israel. Internships are decided upon by a lottery, which is known as the Internship Lottery. In 2014, we redesigned the lottery, replacing it with a more efficient one. This article presents the market, the redesign process, and the new mechanism that is now in use. In this article, we describe the redesign and focus on two-body problems that we faced in the new mechanism. Specifically, we show that decomposing stochastic assignment matrices to deterministic allocations is NP-hard in the presence of couples, and present a polynomial-time algorithm with the optimal worst case guarantee. We also study the performance of our algorithm on real-world and simulated data.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 1-18 |
| Number of pages | 18 |
| Journal | ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation |
| Volume | 6 |
| Issue number | 3-4 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Sep 2018 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2018 Association for Computing Machinery.
Funding
This research was supported in part by a grant from the United States - Israel Binational Science Foundation (BSF), Jerusalem, Israel, by an ISF grant and by a GIF grant. Hassidim is supported by ISF grant 1394/16. Romm is supported by a Falk Institute grant and by ISF grant 1780/16. Part of the research was done while Alon and Romm were co-affiliated with Microsoft Research. Authors’ addresses: S. Bronfman, Computer Sciences, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan, 52900, Israel; email: slavabro@ gmail.com; N. Alon, Tel-Aviv University, Tel-Aviv, 69978, Israel, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, 08544; email: nogaa@ tau.ac.il; A. Hassidim, Computer Sciences, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan, 52900, Israel; email: [email protected]; A. Romm, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, 91905, Israel; email: [email protected]. Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]. © 2018 Association for Computing Machinery. 2167-8375/2018/09-ART21 $15.00 https://doi.org/10.1145/3274646 This research was supported in part by a grant from the United States - Israel Binational Science Foundation (BSF), Jerusalem, Israel, by an ISF grant and by a GIF grant. Hassidim is supported by ISF grant 1394/16. Romm is supported by a Falk Institute grant and by ISF grant 1780/16. Part of the research was done while Alon and Romm were co-affiliated with Microsoft Research.
| Funders | Funder number |
|---|---|
| Falk Institute | 1780/16 |
| United States - Israel Binational Agricultural Research and Development Fund | |
| Resnick Sustainability Institute for Science, Energy and Sustainability, California Institute of Technology | |
| German-Israeli Foundation for Scientific Research and Development | |
| United States-Israel Binational Science Foundation | |
| Israel Science Foundation | |
| National Science Foundation | 1394/16 |
Keywords
- Assignment problem
- Market design
- Matching with couples