Punishment for sabotage in dynamic tournaments

Doron Klunover

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Punishment is incorporated into Gürtler and Münster (2010) two-round three-player tournament with both productive and sabotage effort by allowing the organizer to punish only one saboteur and only in one round. Two efficiency criteria are considered and it is found that even if in round 1 the organizer could punish more than one player, she should still choose to punish in round 2. This suggests that a principal with limited authority should be patient and ignore sabotage when carried out by workers in the early stages of their career but punish them if they are close to promotion.

Original languageEnglish
Article number102841
JournalJournal of Mathematical Economics
Volume106
DOIs
StatePublished - May 2023
Externally publishedYes

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2023 Elsevier B.V.

Keywords

  • Dynamic tournaments
  • Labor market
  • Punishment
  • Sabotage

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