TY - GEN

T1 - Publish and perish

T2 - SPAA 2006: 18th Annual ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures

AU - Lotker, Zvi

AU - Patt-Shamir, Boaz

AU - Tuttle, Mark R.

PY - 2006

Y1 - 2006

N2 - We consider the following abstraction of competing publications. There are n players vying for the attention of the audience. The attention of the audience is abstracted by a single slot which holds, at any given time, the name of the latest release. Each player needs to choose, ahead of time, when to release its product, and the goal is to maximize the amount of time its product is the latest release. Formally, each player i chooses a point x i ∈ [0, 1], and its payoff is the distance from its point x i to the next larger point, or to 1 if x i is the largest. For this game, we give a complete characterization of the Nash equilibrium for the two-player, continuous-action game, and, more important, we give an efficient approximation algorithm to compute numerically the symmetric Nash equilibrium for the n-player game. The approximation is computed via a discrete-action version of the game. In both cases, we show that the (symmetric) equilibrium is unique. Our algorithmic approach to the n-player game is non-standard in that it does not involve solving a system of differential equations. We believe that our techniques can be useful in the analysis of other timing games.

AB - We consider the following abstraction of competing publications. There are n players vying for the attention of the audience. The attention of the audience is abstracted by a single slot which holds, at any given time, the name of the latest release. Each player needs to choose, ahead of time, when to release its product, and the goal is to maximize the amount of time its product is the latest release. Formally, each player i chooses a point x i ∈ [0, 1], and its payoff is the distance from its point x i to the next larger point, or to 1 if x i is the largest. For this game, we give a complete characterization of the Nash equilibrium for the two-player, continuous-action game, and, more important, we give an efficient approximation algorithm to compute numerically the symmetric Nash equilibrium for the n-player game. The approximation is computed via a discrete-action version of the game. In both cases, we show that the (symmetric) equilibrium is unique. Our algorithmic approach to the n-player game is non-standard in that it does not involve solving a system of differential equations. We believe that our techniques can be useful in the analysis of other timing games.

KW - Nash equilibrium

KW - Numerical algorithms

KW - Timing games

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=33749548070&partnerID=8YFLogxK

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AN - SCOPUS:33749548070

SN - 1595934529

SN - 9781595934529

T3 - Annual ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures

SP - 11

EP - 19

BT - SPAA 2006

Y2 - 30 July 2006 through 2 August 2006

ER -