PSI from PaXoS: Fast, Malicious Private Set Intersection

Benny Pinkas; Mike Rosulek; Ni Trieu; Avishay Yanai

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-45724-2_25

PSI from PaXoS: Fast, Malicious Private Set Intersection

Benny Pinkas, Mike Rosulek, Ni Trieu, Avishay Yanai

Department of Computer Science

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

113 Scopus citations

Abstract

We present a 2-party private set intersection (PSI) protocol which provides security against malicious participants, yet is almost as fast as the fastest known semi-honest PSI protocol of Kolesnikov et al. (CCS 2016). Our protocol is based on a new approach for two-party PSI, which can be instantiated to provide security against either malicious or semi-honest adversaries. The protocol is unique in that the only difference between the semi-honest and malicious versions is an instantiation with different parameters for a linear error-correction code. It is also the first PSI protocol which is concretely efficient while having linear communication and security against malicious adversaries, while running in the OT-hybrid model (assuming a non-programmable random oracle). State of the art semi-honest PSI protocols take advantage of cuckoo hashing, but it has proven a challenge to use cuckoo hashing for malicious security. Our protocol is the first to use cuckoo hashing for malicious-secure PSI. We do so via a new data structure, called a probe-and-XOR of strings (PaXoS), which may be of independent interest. This abstraction captures important properties of previous data structures, most notably garbled Bloom filters. While an encoding by a garbled Bloom filter is larger by a factor of Ω (λ) than the original data, we describe a significantly improved PaXoS based on cuckoo hashing that achieves constant rate while being no worse in other relevant efficiency measures.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2020 - 39th Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, Proceedings
Editors	Anne Canteaut, Yuval Ishai
Publisher	Springer
Pages	739-767
Number of pages	29
ISBN (Print)	9783030457235
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45724-2_25
State	Published - 2020
Event	39th Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, EUROCRYPT 2020 - Zagreb, Croatia Duration: 10 May 2020 → 14 May 2020

Publication series

Name	Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume	12106 LNCS
ISSN (Print)	0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)	1611-3349

Conference

Conference	39th Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, EUROCRYPT 2020
Country/Territory	Croatia
City	Zagreb
Period	10/05/20 → 14/05/20

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© International Association for Cryptologic Research 2020.

Funding

The first and fourth authors are supported by the BIU Center for Research in Applied Cryptography and Cyber Security in conjunction with the Israel National Cyber Bureau in the Prime Minister’s Office and by a grant from the Israel Science Foundation. The second and third authors are supported by NSF award 1617197, a Google faculty award, and a Visa faculty award. Part of the work was done while the fourth author is at Bar-Ilan University. This research is based upon work supported in part by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA), via 2019-19-020700006. The views and conclusions contained herein are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, of ODNI, IARPA, or the U.S. Government. The U.S. Government is authorized to reproduce and distribute reprints for governmental purposes notwithstanding any copyright annotation therein.

Funders	Funder number
National Science Foundation	1617197
Google
Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity	2019-19-020700006
Israel Science Foundation

Access to Document

10.1007/978-3-030-45724-2_25

Cite this

Pinkas, B., Rosulek, M., Trieu, N., & Yanai, A. (2020). PSI from PaXoS: Fast, Malicious Private Set Intersection. In A. Canteaut, & Y. Ishai (Eds.), Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2020 - 39th Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, Proceedings (pp. 739-767). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 12106 LNCS). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45724-2_25

Pinkas, Benny ; Rosulek, Mike ; Trieu, Ni et al. / PSI from PaXoS : Fast, Malicious Private Set Intersection. Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2020 - 39th Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, Proceedings. editor / Anne Canteaut ; Yuval Ishai. Springer, 2020. pp. 739-767 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)).

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abstract = "We present a 2-party private set intersection (PSI) protocol which provides security against malicious participants, yet is almost as fast as the fastest known semi-honest PSI protocol of Kolesnikov et al. (CCS 2016). Our protocol is based on a new approach for two-party PSI, which can be instantiated to provide security against either malicious or semi-honest adversaries. The protocol is unique in that the only difference between the semi-honest and malicious versions is an instantiation with different parameters for a linear error-correction code. It is also the first PSI protocol which is concretely efficient while having linear communication and security against malicious adversaries, while running in the OT-hybrid model (assuming a non-programmable random oracle). State of the art semi-honest PSI protocols take advantage of cuckoo hashing, but it has proven a challenge to use cuckoo hashing for malicious security. Our protocol is the first to use cuckoo hashing for malicious-secure PSI. We do so via a new data structure, called a probe-and-XOR of strings (PaXoS), which may be of independent interest. This abstraction captures important properties of previous data structures, most notably garbled Bloom filters. While an encoding by a garbled Bloom filter is larger by a factor of Ω (λ) than the original data, we describe a significantly improved PaXoS based on cuckoo hashing that achieves constant rate while being no worse in other relevant efficiency measures.",

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Pinkas, B, Rosulek, M, Trieu, N & Yanai, A 2020, PSI from PaXoS: Fast, Malicious Private Set Intersection. in A Canteaut & Y Ishai (eds), Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2020 - 39th Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 12106 LNCS, Springer, pp. 739-767, 39th Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, EUROCRYPT 2020, Zagreb, Croatia, 10/05/20. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45724-2_25

PSI from PaXoS: Fast, Malicious Private Set Intersection. / Pinkas, Benny; Rosulek, Mike; Trieu, Ni et al.
Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2020 - 39th Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, Proceedings. ed. / Anne Canteaut; Yuval Ishai. Springer, 2020. p. 739-767 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 12106 LNCS).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

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Pinkas B, Rosulek M, Trieu N, Yanai A. PSI from PaXoS: Fast, Malicious Private Set Intersection. In Canteaut A, Ishai Y, editors, Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2020 - 39th Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, Proceedings. Springer. 2020. p. 739-767. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)). doi: 10.1007/978-3-030-45724-2_25

PSI from PaXoS: Fast, Malicious Private Set Intersection

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