TY - JOUR
T1 - Protection, lobbying, and market structure
AU - Hillman, Arye L.
AU - Van Long, Ngo
AU - Soubeyran, Antoine
PY - 2001
Y1 - 2001
N2 - We look at a model of lobbying by oligopolistic industry where firms allocate resources between lobbying and internal cost-reducing activities. We ask the following questions: (i) if firms differ with respect to comparative advantage in lobbying, what is the equilibrium allocation of resources between lobbying and cost-reducing activities? (ii) Can lobbying opportunities reverse the profitability ranking among firms? (iii) Under what condition is the conventional wisdom that highly concentrated industries tend to obtain more protection valid? The answers depend on various measures of comparative advantage in lobbying and on the demand curve.
AB - We look at a model of lobbying by oligopolistic industry where firms allocate resources between lobbying and internal cost-reducing activities. We ask the following questions: (i) if firms differ with respect to comparative advantage in lobbying, what is the equilibrium allocation of resources between lobbying and cost-reducing activities? (ii) Can lobbying opportunities reverse the profitability ranking among firms? (iii) Under what condition is the conventional wisdom that highly concentrated industries tend to obtain more protection valid? The answers depend on various measures of comparative advantage in lobbying and on the demand curve.
KW - Internal cost-reducing activities
KW - Lobbying
KW - Oligopolistic industry
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0034958412&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/S0022-1996(01)00085-X
DO - 10.1016/S0022-1996(01)00085-X
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AN - SCOPUS:0034958412
SN - 0022-1996
VL - 54
SP - 383
EP - 409
JO - Journal of International Economics
JF - Journal of International Economics
IS - 2
ER -