Abstract
Fault-based attacks against cryptographic circuits must be addressed by techniques that are different from approaches designed for random transient faults. We systematically investigate robust error-detecting codes that specifically target malicious attacks and guarantee minimal bounds on detection probability. Our study is based on FPGA-supported fault-injection campaigns on the circuit implementation of a recent lightweight block cipher and its sub-modules. We quantify the detection capabilities of different robust and non-robust codes with respect to both random faults and malicious attacks, as well as the required overheads. For the first time, we report performance of a novel punctured cubic code on actual cryptographic circuitry. Experimental results show that robust codes with a certain number of redundant bits have better detection properties in security context and higher predictability than their conventional linear counterparts.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Proceedings - IEEE International Symposium on Defect and Fault Tolerance in VLSI Systems |
Publisher | Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. |
Pages | 40-45 |
Number of pages | 6 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9781479961559 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 18 Nov 2014 |
Event | 27th IEEE International Symposium on Defect and Fault Tolerance in VLSI and Nanotechnology Systems, DFT 2014 - Amsterdam, Netherlands Duration: 1 Oct 2014 → 3 Oct 2014 |
Publication series
Name | Proceedings - IEEE International Symposium on Defect and Fault Tolerance in VLSI Systems |
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ISSN (Print) | 1550-5774 |
Conference
Conference | 27th IEEE International Symposium on Defect and Fault Tolerance in VLSI and Nanotechnology Systems, DFT 2014 |
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Country/Territory | Netherlands |
City | Amsterdam |
Period | 1/10/14 → 3/10/14 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2014 IEEE.