Proactive public key and signature systems

Amir Herzberg; Markus Jakobsson; Stanislaw Jarecki; Hugo Krawczyk; Moti Yung

doi:10.1145/266420.266442

Proactive public key and signature systems

Amir Herzberg, Markus Jakobsson, Stanislaw Jarecki, Hugo Krawczyk, Moti Yung

Haifa Scientific Cent

Research output: Contribution to conference › Paper › peer-review

182 Scopus citations

Abstract

Proactive public key systems where the threshold solutions are further enhanced, are presented by periodic refreshment of the shared function in such a way that the private key is kept unchanged for as long as required, yet breaking of the system requires the attacker to break into several locations in a short period of time. Such solutions are presented for a variety of discrete log based cryptosystems including DSS and Schnorr signatures, ElGamal-like signatures and encryption, and undeniable signatures.

Original language	English
Pages	100-110
Number of pages	11
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1145/266420.266442
State	Published - 1997
Externally published	Yes
Event	Proceedings of the 1997 4th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security - Zurich, Switz Duration: 1 Apr 1997 → 4 Apr 1997

Conference

Conference	Proceedings of the 1997 4th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
City	Zurich, Switz
Period	1/04/97 → 4/04/97

Access to Document

10.1145/266420.266442

Cite this

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AU - Krawczyk, Hugo

AU - Yung, Moti

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AB - Proactive public key systems where the threshold solutions are further enhanced, are presented by periodic refreshment of the shared function in such a way that the private key is kept unchanged for as long as required, yet breaking of the system requires the attacker to break into several locations in a short period of time. Such solutions are presented for a variety of discrete log based cryptosystems including DSS and Schnorr signatures, ElGamal-like signatures and encryption, and undeniable signatures.

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Proactive public key and signature systems

Abstract

Conference

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