Private provision of a public good with time-allocation choice

Nava Kahana, Doron Klunover

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    3 Scopus citations


    When individuals with the same preferences but different abilities and non-labor incomes allocate time between leisure and labor and contribute to a pure public good, the order of the contributors’ equilibrium utilities in the Nash equilibrium is a perfect inversion of the order of their abilities, and the supply of the public good is not neutral to the ability distribution.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)379-386
    Number of pages8
    JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
    Issue number2
    StatePublished - 1 Aug 2016

    Bibliographical note

    Publisher Copyright:
    © 2016, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.


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