Position-based quantum cryptography:Impossibility and constructions

Harry Buhrma, Nishanth Chandran, Serge Fehr, Ran Gelles, Vipul Goyal, Rafail Ostrovsky, Christian Schaffner

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

55 Scopus citations

Abstract

In this work, we study position-based cryptography in the quantum setting. The aim is to use the geographical position of a party as its only credential. On the negative side, we show that if adversaries are allowed to share an arbitrarily large entangled quantum state, the task of secure position-verification is impossible. To this end, we prove the following very general result. Assume that Alice and Bob hold respectively subsystems A and B of a (possibly) unknown quantum state |Ψ> ε HA ⊗HB. Their goal is to calculate and share a new state |φ> = U|Ψ>, where U is a fixed unitary operation. The question that we ask is how many rounds of mutual communication are needed. It is easy to achieve such a task using two rounds of classical communication, whereas, in general, it is impossible with no communication at all. Surprisingly, in case Alice and Bob share enough entanglement to start with and we allow an arbitrarily small failure probability, we show that the same task can be done using a single round of classical communication in which Alice and Bob exchange two classical messages. Actually, we prove that a relaxed version of the task can be done with no communication at all, where the task is to compute instead a state |φ'> that coincides with |φ> = U|Ψ> up to local operations on A and on B, which are determined by classical information held by Alice and Bob. The one-round scheme for the original task then follows as a simple corollary. We also show that these results generalize to more players. As a consequence, we show a generic attack that breaks any position-verification scheme. On the positive side, we show that if adversaries do not share any entangled quantum state but can compute arbitrary quantum operations, secureposition-verification is achievable. Jointly, these results suggest the interesting question whether secure position-verification is possible in case of a bounded amount of entanglement. Our positive result can be interpreted as resolving this question in the simplest case, where the bound is set to zero. In models where secure position-verification is achievable, it has a number of interestingapplications. For example, it enables secure communication over an insecure channel without having any preshared key, with the guarantee that only a party at a specific location can learn the content of the conversation. More generally, we show that in settings where secure position-verification is achievable, other position-based cryptographic schemes are possible as well, such as secure positionbased authentication and position-based key agreement.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)150-178
Number of pages29
JournalSIAM Journal on Computing
Volume43
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - 2014
Externally publishedYes

Funding

FundersFunder number
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
National Science FoundationCNS-0830803
National Science Foundation
Directorate for Computer and Information Science and Engineering1065276, 0716389, 0830803, 0716835, 0916574

    Keywords

    • Position-based cryptography
    • Quantum distributed computation
    • Quantum key distribution

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