Pereboom’s Defense of Deliberation-Compatibilism: A Problem Remains

David Widerker

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Scopus citations


Pereboom’s defense of deliberation-compatibilism is the most elaborate and most sophisticated current attempt to defend this position. In this paper, I have provided a careful, and open-minded assessment of that defense. The conclusion that emerged is that it is subject to an important objection that leaves him with no explanation of the relevant difference between a scenario in which it would irrational for an agent to deliberate what to do, and a scenario the deliberation-compatibilist would consider appropriate for rational deliberation. Without a satisfactory response to this objection, Pereboom’s defense of deliberation-compatibilism cannot be deemed successful.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)333-345
Number of pages13
JournalJournal of Ethics
Issue number3
StatePublished - 15 Sep 2019

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2019, Springer Nature B.V.


  • Deliberation-compatibilism
  • Deliberationincompatibilism
  • Determinism
  • Free will
  • Free will skepticism
  • Kapitan
  • Nelkin
  • Pereboom
  • Rational deliberation
  • Searle
  • van Inwagen


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