Abstract
Pereboom’s defense of deliberation-compatibilism is the most elaborate and most sophisticated current attempt to defend this position. In this paper, I have provided a careful, and open-minded assessment of that defense. The conclusion that emerged is that it is subject to an important objection that leaves him with no explanation of the relevant difference between a scenario in which it would irrational for an agent to deliberate what to do, and a scenario the deliberation-compatibilist would consider appropriate for rational deliberation. Without a satisfactory response to this objection, Pereboom’s defense of deliberation-compatibilism cannot be deemed successful.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 333-345 |
Number of pages | 13 |
Journal | Journal of Ethics |
Volume | 23 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 15 Sep 2019 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2019, Springer Nature B.V.
Keywords
- Deliberation-compatibilism
- Deliberationincompatibilism
- Determinism
- Free will
- Free will skepticism
- Kapitan
- Nelkin
- Pereboom
- Rational deliberation
- Searle
- van Inwagen