Abstract
This paper presents a unifying framework for the club participation problem using compensating variation measures of willingness-to-pay for membership. With more prospective club members than the equilibrium club population, Pareto-efficient participation rules are derived which depend upon whether or not individuals are assured of club access. Sale of lottery tickets offering club membership is shown to be a socially superior club participation allocation mechanism to sale of vouchers guaranteeing membership. The willingness-to-pay format readily encompasses the Buchanan case where all prospective club members are assured of club participation.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 55-76 |
| Number of pages | 22 |
| Journal | Journal of Public Economics |
| Volume | 20 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Feb 1983 |