TY - JOUR
T1 - On tolerant cryptographic constructions
AU - Herzberg, Amir
PY - 2005
Y1 - 2005
N2 - Cryptographic schemes are often constructed using multiple component cryptographic modules. A construction is tolerant for a (security) specification if it meets the specification, provided a majority (or other threshold) of the components meet their specifications. We define tolerant constructions, and investigate 'folklore', practical cascade and parallel constructions. In particular, we show that cascading encryption schemes provides tolerance under chosen plaintext attack, non-adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (CCA1) and a weak form of adaptive chosne ciphertext attack (weak CCA2), but not under the 'standard' CCA2 attack. Similarly, certain parallel constructions ensure tolerance for unforgeability of Signature/MAC schemes, OWF, ERF, AONT and certain collision-resistant hash functions. We present (new) tolerant constructions for (several variants of) commitment schemes, by composing simple constructions, and general method of composing tolerant constructions. Our constructions are simple, efficient and practical. To ensure practicality, we use concrete security analysis (in addition to the simpler asymptotic analysis).
AB - Cryptographic schemes are often constructed using multiple component cryptographic modules. A construction is tolerant for a (security) specification if it meets the specification, provided a majority (or other threshold) of the components meet their specifications. We define tolerant constructions, and investigate 'folklore', practical cascade and parallel constructions. In particular, we show that cascading encryption schemes provides tolerance under chosen plaintext attack, non-adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (CCA1) and a weak form of adaptive chosne ciphertext attack (weak CCA2), but not under the 'standard' CCA2 attack. Similarly, certain parallel constructions ensure tolerance for unforgeability of Signature/MAC schemes, OWF, ERF, AONT and certain collision-resistant hash functions. We present (new) tolerant constructions for (several variants of) commitment schemes, by composing simple constructions, and general method of composing tolerant constructions. Our constructions are simple, efficient and practical. To ensure practicality, we use concrete security analysis (in addition to the simpler asymptotic analysis).
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=24144475180&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-540-30574-3_13
DO - 10.1007/978-3-540-30574-3_13
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AN - SCOPUS:24144475180
SN - 0302-9743
VL - 3376
SP - 172
EP - 190
JO - Lecture Notes in Computer Science
JF - Lecture Notes in Computer Science
T2 - RSA Conference 2005
Y2 - 14 February 2005 through 18 February 2005
ER -