On the surge of altruism

Nava Kahana

doi:10.1007/s00148-005-0230-9

On the surge of altruism

Nava Kahana

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

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Abstract

To date, many arguments to explain altruistic behavior were based on 'kin selection'. This note shows that evolution can sustain altruism even if the players are not necessarily genetically linked. Depending on the payoff parameters in a prisoner's dilemma game, there can be four distinct types of equilibria, for each of them the proportion of altruists in the population is described.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	261-266
Number of pages	6
Journal	Journal of Population Economics
Volume	18
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00148-005-0230-9
State	Published - Jun 2005

Keywords

Evolution of altruism
Siblings
Strangers

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10.1007/s00148-005-0230-9

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On the surge of altruism

Abstract

Keywords

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