TY - JOUR
T1 - On the surge of altruism
AU - Kahana, Nava
PY - 2005/6
Y1 - 2005/6
N2 - To date, many arguments to explain altruistic behavior were based on 'kin selection'. This note shows that evolution can sustain altruism even if the players are not necessarily genetically linked. Depending on the payoff parameters in a prisoner's dilemma game, there can be four distinct types of equilibria, for each of them the proportion of altruists in the population is described.
AB - To date, many arguments to explain altruistic behavior were based on 'kin selection'. This note shows that evolution can sustain altruism even if the players are not necessarily genetically linked. Depending on the payoff parameters in a prisoner's dilemma game, there can be four distinct types of equilibria, for each of them the proportion of altruists in the population is described.
KW - Evolution of altruism
KW - Siblings
KW - Strangers
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=26044438779&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s00148-005-0230-9
DO - 10.1007/s00148-005-0230-9
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AN - SCOPUS:26044438779
SN - 0933-1433
VL - 18
SP - 261
EP - 266
JO - Journal of Population Economics
JF - Journal of Population Economics
IS - 2
ER -