On the surge of altruism

Nava Kahana

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Scopus citations


To date, many arguments to explain altruistic behavior were based on 'kin selection'. This note shows that evolution can sustain altruism even if the players are not necessarily genetically linked. Depending on the payoff parameters in a prisoner's dilemma game, there can be four distinct types of equilibria, for each of them the proportion of altruists in the population is described.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)261-266
Number of pages6
JournalJournal of Population Economics
Issue number2
StatePublished - Jun 2005


  • Evolution of altruism
  • Siblings
  • Strangers


Dive into the research topics of 'On the surge of altruism'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this