On the Round Complexity of Randomized Byzantine Agreement

Ran Cohen; Iftach Haitner; Nikolaos Makriyannis; Matan Orland; Alex Samorodnitsky

On the Round Complexity of Randomized Byzantine Agreement

Ran Cohen, Iftach Haitner, Nikolaos Makriyannis, Matan Orland, Alex Samorodnitsky

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

We prove lower bounds on the round complexity of randomized Byzantine agreement (BA) protocols, bounding the halting probability of such protocols after one and two rounds. In particular, we prove that: 1. BA protocols resilient against n/3 [resp., n/4] corruptions terminate (under attack) at the end of the first round with probability at most o(1) [resp., 1 / 2 + o(1)]. 2. BA protocols resilient against a fraction of corruptions greater than 1/4 terminate at the end of the second round with probability at most 1 - Θ (1). 3. For a large class of protocols (including all BA protocols used in practice) and under a plausible combinatorial conjecture, BA protocols resilient against a fraction of corruptions greater than 1/3 [resp., 1/4] terminate at the end of the second round with probability at most o(1) [resp., 1 / 2 + o(1)]. The above bounds hold even when the parties use a trusted setup phase, e.g., a public-key infrastructure (PKI). The third bound essentially matches the recent protocol of Micali (ITCS’17) that tolerates up to n/3 corruptions and terminates at the end of the third round with constant probability.

Original language	English
Article number	10
Journal	Journal of Cryptology
Volume	35
Issue number	2
State	Published - Apr 2022
Externally published	Yes

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2022, International Association for Cryptologic Research.

Funding

Iftach Haitner: Member of the Check Point Institute for Information Security. Research supported by Israel Science Foundation Grant 666/19. Research supported by ERC starting Grant 638121. Ran Cohen: Research supported in part by NSF Grant No. 2055568. Some of this work was done while the author was a post-doc at Tel Aviv University, supported by ERC starting Grant 638121. Nikolaos Makriyannis: This work was done while the author was a post-doc at Technion, supported by ERC advanced Grant 742754. Research supported by ERC starting Grant 638121. Alex Samorodnitsky: Research partially supported by ISF Grant 1724/15. Matan Orland: Research supported by ERC starting Grant 638121.

Funders	Funder number
National Science Foundation	2055568
European Commission	638121, 742754
Israel Science Foundation	666/19, 1724/15
Tel Aviv University
Technion-Israel Institute of Technology

Keywords

Byzantine agreement
Lower bound
Round complexity

Cite this

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AB - We prove lower bounds on the round complexity of randomized Byzantine agreement (BA) protocols, bounding the halting probability of such protocols after one and two rounds. In particular, we prove that: 1. BA protocols resilient against n/3 [resp., n/4] corruptions terminate (under attack) at the end of the first round with probability at most o(1) [resp., 1 / 2 + o(1)]. 2. BA protocols resilient against a fraction of corruptions greater than 1/4 terminate at the end of the second round with probability at most 1 - Θ (1). 3. For a large class of protocols (including all BA protocols used in practice) and under a plausible combinatorial conjecture, BA protocols resilient against a fraction of corruptions greater than 1/3 [resp., 1/4] terminate at the end of the second round with probability at most o(1) [resp., 1 / 2 + o(1)]. The above bounds hold even when the parties use a trusted setup phase, e.g., a public-key infrastructure (PKI). The third bound essentially matches the recent protocol of Micali (ITCS’17) that tolerates up to n/3 corruptions and terminates at the end of the third round with constant probability.

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On the Round Complexity of Randomized Byzantine Agreement

Abstract

Bibliographical note

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Keywords

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