On the luck objection to libertarianism

David Widerker, Ira M. Schnall

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

Abstract

Libertarians typically believe that we are morally responsible for the decisions (or choices) we make only if those decisions are free, and our decisions are free only if they are neither deterministically caused nor nomically necessitated by antecedent events. A well-known objection to their view is what we may call ‘The Randomness Objection’
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationAgency, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility
PublisherPalgrave Macmillan
Pages94-115
Number of pages22
ISBN (Electronic)9781137414953
ISBN (Print)9781137414946
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Jan 2016

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