On the luck objection to libertarianism

David Widerker; Ira M. Schnall

doi:10.1057/9781137414953

On the luck objection to libertarianism

David Widerker, Ira M. Schnall

Department of Philosophy

Bar-Ilan University

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter › peer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

Libertarians typically believe that we are morally responsible for the decisions (or choices) we make only if those decisions are free, and our decisions are free only if they are neither deterministically caused nor nomically necessitated by antecedent events. A well-known objection to their view is what we may call ‘The Randomness Objection’

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Agency, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility
Publisher	Palgrave Macmillan
Pages	94-115
Number of pages	22
ISBN (Electronic)	9781137414953
ISBN (Print)	9781137414946
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137414953
State	Published - 1 Jan 2016

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On the luck objection to libertarianism

Abstract

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