On Braess’ Paradox and Average Quality of Service in Transportation Network Cooperative Games

Mauro Passacantando, Giorgio Gnecco, Yuval Hadas, Marcello Sanguineti

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

In the theory of congestion games, the Braess’ paradox shows that adding one resource to a network may sometimes worsen, rather than improve, the overall network performance. Here the paradox is investigated under a cooperative game-theoretic setting, in contrast to the non-cooperative one typically adopted in the literature. A family of cooperative games on networks is considered, whose utility function, defined in terms of a traffic assignment problem and the associated Wardrop equilibrium, expresses the average quality of service perceived by the network users.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationAIRO Springer Series
PublisherSpringer Nature
Pages27-37
Number of pages11
DOIs
StatePublished - 2021

Publication series

NameAIRO Springer Series
Volume7
ISSN (Print)2523-7047
ISSN (Electronic)2523-7055

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2021, The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG.

Keywords

  • Braess’ paradox
  • Quality of service
  • Traffic assignment
  • Transferable utility games
  • Transportation networks
  • User equilibrium

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