On Braess’ Paradox and Average Quality of Service in Transportation Network Cooperative Games

Mauro Passacantando, Giorgio Gnecco, Yuval Hadas, Marcello Sanguineti

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

In the theory of congestion games, the Braess’ paradox shows that adding one resource to a network may sometimes worsen, rather than improve, the overall network performance. Here the paradox is investigated under a cooperative game-theoretic setting, in contrast to the non-cooperative one typically adopted in the literature. A family of cooperative games on networks is considered, whose utility function, defined in terms of a traffic assignment problem and the associated Wardrop equilibrium, expresses the average quality of service perceived by the network users.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationAIRO Springer Series
PublisherSpringer Nature
Pages27-37
Number of pages11
DOIs
StatePublished - 2021

Publication series

NameAIRO Springer Series
Volume7
ISSN (Print)2523-7047
ISSN (Electronic)2523-7055

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2021, The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG.

Funding

G. Gnecco, M. Passacantando and M. Sanguineti are members of the Gruppo Nazionale per l’Analisi Matematica, la Probabilità e le loro Applicazioni (GNAMPA–National Group for Mathematical Analysis, Probability and their Applications) of the Istituto Nazionale di Alta Matematica (INdAM–National Institute of Higher Mathematics). G. Gnecco and M. Sanguineti acknowledge support from the Università Italo Francese (project GALILEO 2021 no. G21_89). M. Sanguineti was partially supported by the Project PDGP 2018/20 DIT.AD016.001 “Technologies for Smart Communities” of INM (Institute for Marine Engineering) of CNR (National Research Council of Italy), where he is Research Associate. He is also Affiliated Resercher at IIT—Italian Institute of Technology (Advanced Robotics Research Line), Genova, and Visiting Professor at IMT—School for Advances Studies (AXES Research Unit), Lucca. Acknowledgments G. Gnecco, M. Passacantando and M. Sanguineti are members of the Gruppo Nazionale per l’Analisi Matematica, la Probabilità e le loro Applicazioni (GNAMPA–National Group for Mathematical Analysis, Probability and their Applications) of the Istituto Nazionale di Alta Matematica (INdAM–National Institute of Higher Mathematics). G. Gnecco and M. Sanguineti acknowledge support from the Università Italo Francese (project GALILEO 2021 no. G21_89). M. Sanguineti was partially supported by the Project PDGP 2018/20 DIT.AD016.001 “Technologies for Smart Communities” of INM (Institute for Marine Engineering) of CNR (National Research Council of Italy), where he is Research Associate. He is also Affiliated Resercher at IIT—Italian Institute of Technology (Advanced Robotics Research Line), Genova, and Visiting Professor at IMT—School for Advances Studies (AXES Research Unit), Lucca.

FundersFunder number
INdAM—National Institute of Higher Mathematics
Istituto Nazionale di Alta Matematica "Francesco Severi"
Gruppo Nazionale per l'Analisi Matematica, la Probabilità e le loro Applicazioni
Università Italo FranceseG21_89, PDGP 2018/20 DIT.AD016.001
Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche
Istituto Italiano di Tecnologia

    Keywords

    • Braess’ paradox
    • Quality of service
    • Traffic assignment
    • Transferable utility games
    • Transportation networks
    • User equilibrium

    Fingerprint

    Dive into the research topics of 'On Braess’ Paradox and Average Quality of Service in Transportation Network Cooperative Games'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

    Cite this