Abstract
We study the problem of non-interactive multiparty computation (NI-MPC) where a group of completely asynchronous parties can evaluate a function over their joint inputs by sending a single message to an evaluator who computes the output. Previously, the only general solutions to this problem that resisted collusions between the evaluator and a set of parties were based on multi-input functional encryption and required the use of complex correlated randomness setup. In this work, we present a new solution for NI-MPC against arbitrary collusions using a public-key infrastructure (PKI) setup supplemented with a common random string. A PKI is, in fact, the minimal setup that one can hope for in this model in order to achieve a meaningful “best possible” notion of security, namely, that an adversary that corrupts the evaluator and an arbitrary set of parties only learns the residual function obtained by restricting the function to the inputs of the uncorrupted parties. Our solution is based on indistinguishability obfuscation and DDH both with sub-exponential security. We extend this main result to the case of general interaction patterns, providing the above best possible security that is achievable for the given interaction. Our main result gives rise to a novel notion of (public-key) multiparty obfuscation, where n parties can independently obfuscate program modules Mi such that the obfuscated modules, when put together, exhibit the functionality of the program obtained by “combining” the underlying modules Mi. This notion may be of independent interest.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2017 - 23rd International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptology and Information Security, Proceedings |
Editors | Tsuyoshi Takagi, Thomas Peyrin |
Publisher | Springer Verlag |
Pages | 181-211 |
Number of pages | 31 |
ISBN (Print) | 9783319706993 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 2017 |
Externally published | Yes |
Event | 23rd Annual International Conference on Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security, ASIACRYPT 2017 - Hong Kong, Hong Kong Duration: 3 Dec 2017 → 7 Dec 2017 |
Publication series
Name | Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) |
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Volume | 10626 LNCS |
ISSN (Print) | 0302-9743 |
ISSN (Electronic) | 1611-3349 |
Conference
Conference | 23rd Annual International Conference on Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security, ASIACRYPT 2017 |
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Country/Territory | Hong Kong |
City | Hong Kong |
Period | 3/12/17 → 7/12/17 |
Bibliographical note
Funding Information:Acknowledgments. Shai Halevi was supported by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and Army Research Office (ARO) under Contract No. W911NF-15-C-0236. Yuval Ishai was supported in part by NSF-BSF grant 2015782, BSF grant 2012366, ISF grant 1709/14, ERC grant 742754, DARPA/ARL SAFEWARE award, NSF Frontier Award 1413955, NSF grants 1619348, 1228984, 1136174, and 1065276, a Xerox Faculty Research Award, a Google Faculty Research Award, an equipment grant from Intel, and an Okawa Foundation Research Grant. This material is based upon work supported by the DARPA through the ARL under Contract W911NF-15-C-0205. Abhishek Jain was supported in part by a DARPA/ARL Safeware Grant W911NF-15-C-0213 and a sub-award from NSF CNS-1414023. Ilan Komargodski is supported in part by Elaine Shi’s Packard Foundation Fellowship. Most of this work done while he was a Ph.D student at the Weizmann Institute of Science, supported in part by grants from the Israel Science Foundation and by a Levzion Fellowship. Amit Sahai was supported in part from a DARPA/ARL SAFEWARE award, NSF Frontier Award 1413955, NSF grants 1619348, 1228984, 1136174, and 1065276, BSF grant 2012378, a Xerox Faculty Research Award, a Google Faculty Research Award, an equipment grant from Intel, and an Okawa Foundation Research Grant. This material is based upon work supported by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency through the ARL under Contract W911NF-15-C-0205. Eylon Yogev is supported in part by a grant from the Israel Science Foundation. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense, the National Science Foundation, or the U.S. Government.
Publisher Copyright:
© International Association for Cryptologic Research 2017.