New Attacks on IDEA with at Least 6 Rounds

Eli Biham; Orr Dunkelman; Nathan Keller; Adi Shamir

doi:10.1007/s00145-013-9162-9

New Attacks on IDEA with at Least 6 Rounds

Eli Biham
, Orr Dunkelman
, Nathan Keller
, Adi Shamir

Department of Mathematics

Technion-Israel Institute of Technology
University of Haifa
Weizmann Institute of Science

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

13 Scopus citations

Abstract

IDEA is a 64-bit block cipher with 128-bit keys which was introduced by Lai and Massey in 1991. The best previously published attack on IDEA could only handle 6 of its 8.5-rounds. In this paper, we combine a highly optimized meet-in-the-middle attack with a keyless version of the Biryukov–Demirci relation to obtain a greatly improved attack on 6-round IDEA which requires only two known plaintexts, and the first key recovery attacks on versions of IDEA with 6.5 to 8.5 rounds.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	209-239
Number of pages	31
Journal	Journal of Cryptology
Volume	28
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00145-013-9162-9
State	Published - Apr 2015

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2013, International Association for Cryptologic Research.

Funding

O. Dunkelman was supported in part by the German–Israeli Foundation for Scientific Research and Development through grant No. 2282-2222.6/2011.

Funders	Funder number
German-Israeli Foundation for Scientific Research and Development
German-Israeli Foundation for Scientific Research and Development	2282-2222.6/2011

Keywords

Biryukov–Demirci relation
Cryptanalysis
IDEA
Zero-in-the-Middle attack

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10.1007/s00145-013-9162-9

Cite this

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title = "New Attacks on IDEA with at Least 6 Rounds",

abstract = "IDEA is a 64-bit block cipher with 128-bit keys which was introduced by Lai and Massey in 1991. The best previously published attack on IDEA could only handle 6 of its 8.5-rounds. In this paper, we combine a highly optimized meet-in-the-middle attack with a keyless version of the Biryukov–Demirci relation to obtain a greatly improved attack on 6-round IDEA which requires only two known plaintexts, and the first key recovery attacks on versions of IDEA with 6.5 to 8.5 rounds.",

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New Attacks on IDEA with at Least 6 Rounds

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Funding

Keywords

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