Nash Bargaining Solution for Cooperative Relaying Exploiting Energy Consumption

Jan Plachy, Zdenek Becvar, Syed Mohammad Zafaruddin, Amir Leshem

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

In this letter, we propose a resource allocation for cooperative relaying in a scenario with a high number of communicating devices. The proposed resource allocation is based on Nash bargaining solution (NBS) and leads to a natural cooperation among devices. The NBS provides an allocation of time intervals maximizing the number of transmitted packets considering energy consumption of devices. The derived NBS is in closed form, thus, it is suitable for wireless communications with time-varying channels as no iterations are needed to find the optimum allocation. Furthermore, linear complexity of the derived NBS allows its application to future mobile networks with a high number of communicating devices.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication2019 IEEE 20th International Workshop on Signal Processing Advances in Wireless Communications, SPAWC 2019
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
ISBN (Electronic)9781538665282
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 2019
Event20th IEEE International Workshop on Signal Processing Advances in Wireless Communications, SPAWC 2019 - Cannes, France
Duration: 2 Jul 20195 Jul 2019

Publication series

NameIEEE Workshop on Signal Processing Advances in Wireless Communications, SPAWC
Volume2019-July

Conference

Conference20th IEEE International Workshop on Signal Processing Advances in Wireless Communications, SPAWC 2019
Country/TerritoryFrance
CityCannes
Period2/07/195/07/19

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2019 IEEE.

Keywords

  • Cooperative game theory
  • Nash bargaining
  • cooperative relaying
  • energy consumption
  • resource allocation

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Nash Bargaining Solution for Cooperative Relaying Exploiting Energy Consumption'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this