MUDA: A truthful multi-unit double-auction mechanism

Erel Segal-Halevi; Avinatan Hassidim; Yonatan Aumann

MUDA: A truthful multi-unit double-auction mechanism

Erel Segal-Halevi
, Avinatan Hassidim
, Yonatan Aumann

Department of Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence

Ariel University

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

Abstract

In a seminal paper, McAfee (1992) presented a truthful mechanism for double auctions, attaining asymptotically-optimal gain-from-trade without any prior information on the valuations of the traders. McAfee's mechanism handles single-parametric agents, allowing each seller to sell a single unit and each buyer to buy a single unit. This paper presents a double-auction mechanism that handles multi-parametric agents and allows multiple units per trader, as long as the valuation functions of all traders have decreasing marginal returns. The mechanism is prior-free, ex-post individually-rational, dominant-strategy truthful and strongly-budget-balanced. Its gain-from-trade approaches the optimum when the market size is sufficiently large.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	32nd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2018
Publisher	AAAI press
Pages	1193-1201
Number of pages	9
ISBN (Electronic)	9781577358008
State	Published - 2018
Event	32nd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2018 - New Orleans, United States Duration: 2 Feb 2018 → 7 Feb 2018

Publication series

Name	32nd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2018

Conference

Conference	32nd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2018
Country/Territory	United States
City	New Orleans
Period	2/02/18 → 7/02/18

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
Copyright © 2018, Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved.

Funding

Erel was supported by ISF grant 1083/13, Doctoral Fellowships of Excellence Program and Mordecai and Monique Katz Graduate Fellowship Program at Bar-Ilan University. Avinatan Hassidim is supported by ISF grant 1394/16.

Funders	Funder number
Bar-Ilan University	1394/16
Israel Science Foundation	1083/13

Cite this

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title = "MUDA: A truthful multi-unit double-auction mechanism",

abstract = "In a seminal paper, McAfee (1992) presented a truthful mechanism for double auctions, attaining asymptotically-optimal gain-from-trade without any prior information on the valuations of the traders. McAfee's mechanism handles single-parametric agents, allowing each seller to sell a single unit and each buyer to buy a single unit. This paper presents a double-auction mechanism that handles multi-parametric agents and allows multiple units per trader, as long as the valuation functions of all traders have decreasing marginal returns. The mechanism is prior-free, ex-post individually-rational, dominant-strategy truthful and strongly-budget-balanced. Its gain-from-trade approaches the optimum when the market size is sufficiently large.",

author = "Erel Segal-Halevi and Avinatan Hassidim and Yonatan Aumann",

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MUDA: A truthful multi-unit double-auction mechanism. / Segal-Halevi, Erel; Hassidim, Avinatan ; Aumann, Yonatan.
32nd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2018. AAAI press, 2018. p. 1193-1201 (32nd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2018).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

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MUDA: A truthful multi-unit double-auction mechanism

Abstract

Publication series

Conference

Bibliographical note

Funding

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