Minority-proof cheap-talk protocol

Yuval Heller

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2009.11.004

Minority-proof cheap-talk protocol

Yuval Heller

Tel Aviv University

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

8 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper analyzes the implementation of correlated equilibria that are immune to joint deviations of coalitions by cheap-talk protocols. We construct a cheap-talk protocol that is resistant to deviations of fewer than half the players, and using it, we show that a large set of correlated equilibria can be implemented as Nash equilibria in the extended game with cheap-talk. Furthermore, we demonstrate that in general there is no cheap-talk protocol that is resistant for deviations of half the players.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	394-400
Number of pages	7
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	69
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.11.004
State	Published - Jul 2010
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Cheap-talk
Coalition-proof equilibrium
Correlated equilibrium
Fault-tolerant distributed computation
Non-cooperative games
Strong equilibrium

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10.1016/j.geb.2009.11.004

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KW - Coalition-proof equilibrium

KW - Correlated equilibrium

KW - Fault-tolerant distributed computation

KW - Non-cooperative games

KW - Strong equilibrium

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Minority-proof cheap-talk protocol

Abstract

Keywords

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