Minority-proof cheap-talk protocol

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6 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper analyzes the implementation of correlated equilibria that are immune to joint deviations of coalitions by cheap-talk protocols. We construct a cheap-talk protocol that is resistant to deviations of fewer than half the players, and using it, we show that a large set of correlated equilibria can be implemented as Nash equilibria in the extended game with cheap-talk. Furthermore, we demonstrate that in general there is no cheap-talk protocol that is resistant for deviations of half the players.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)394-400
Number of pages7
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume69
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 2010
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Cheap-talk
  • Coalition-proof equilibrium
  • Correlated equilibrium
  • Fault-tolerant distributed computation
  • Non-cooperative games
  • Strong equilibrium

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