Minisum and minimax committee election rules for general preference types

Dorothea Baumeister; Toni Böhnlein; Lisa Rey; Oliver Schaudt; Ann Kathrin Selker

doi:10.3233/978-1-61499-672-9-1656

Minisum and minimax committee election rules for general preference types

Dorothea Baumeister, Toni Böhnlein, Lisa Rey, Oliver Schaudt, Ann Kathrin Selker

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

6 Scopus citations

Abstract

In committee elections it is often assumed that voters only (dis)approve of each candidate or that they rank all candidates, as it is common for single-winner elections. We suggest an intermediate approach, where the voters rank the candidates into a fixed number of groups. This allows more diverse votes than approval votes, but leaves more freedom than in a linear order. A committee is then elected by applying the minisum or minimax approach to minimize the voters' dissatisfaction. We study the axiomatic properties of these committee election rules as well as the complexity of winner determination and show fixed-parameter tractability for our minimax rules.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications
Editors	Gal A. Kaminka, Maria Fox, Paolo Bouquet, Eyke Hullermeier, Virginia Dignum, Frank Dignum, Frank van Harmelen
Publisher	IOS Press BV
Pages	1656-1657
Number of pages	2
ISBN (Electronic)	9781614996712
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-672-9-1656
State	Published - 2016
Externally published	Yes
Event	22nd European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, ECAI 2016 - The Hague, Netherlands Duration: 29 Aug 2016 → 2 Sep 2016

Publication series

Name	Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications
Volume	285
ISSN (Print)	0922-6389
ISSN (Electronic)	1879-8314

Conference

Conference	22nd European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, ECAI 2016
Country/Territory	Netherlands
City	The Hague
Period	29/08/16 → 2/09/16

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2016 The Authors and IOS Press.

Access to Document

10.3233/978-1-61499-672-9-1656

Cite this

Baumeister, D., Böhnlein, T., Rey, L., Schaudt, O., & Selker, A. K. (2016). Minisum and minimax committee election rules for general preference types. In G. A. Kaminka, M. Fox, P. Bouquet, E. Hullermeier, V. Dignum, F. Dignum, & F. van Harmelen (Eds.), Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications (pp. 1656-1657). (Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications; Vol. 285). IOS Press BV. https://doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-672-9-1656

Baumeister, Dorothea ; Böhnlein, Toni ; Rey, Lisa et al. / Minisum and minimax committee election rules for general preference types. Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications. editor / Gal A. Kaminka ; Maria Fox ; Paolo Bouquet ; Eyke Hullermeier ; Virginia Dignum ; Frank Dignum ; Frank van Harmelen. IOS Press BV, 2016. pp. 1656-1657 (Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications).

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Baumeister, D, Böhnlein, T, Rey, L, Schaudt, O & Selker, AK 2016, Minisum and minimax committee election rules for general preference types. in GA Kaminka, M Fox, P Bouquet, E Hullermeier, V Dignum, F Dignum & F van Harmelen (eds), Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications. Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications, vol. 285, IOS Press BV, pp. 1656-1657, 22nd European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, ECAI 2016, The Hague, Netherlands, 29/08/16. https://doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-672-9-1656

Minisum and minimax committee election rules for general preference types. / Baumeister, Dorothea; Böhnlein, Toni; Rey, Lisa et al.
Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications. ed. / Gal A. Kaminka; Maria Fox; Paolo Bouquet; Eyke Hullermeier; Virginia Dignum; Frank Dignum; Frank van Harmelen. IOS Press BV, 2016. p. 1656-1657 (Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications; Vol. 285).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

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Baumeister D, Böhnlein T, Rey L, Schaudt O, Selker AK. Minisum and minimax committee election rules for general preference types. In Kaminka GA, Fox M, Bouquet P, Hullermeier E, Dignum V, Dignum F, van Harmelen F, editors, Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications. IOS Press BV. 2016. p. 1656-1657. (Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications). doi: 10.3233/978-1-61499-672-9-1656

Minisum and minimax committee election rules for general preference types

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