Minding (Your Own and) Others’ Business: Assigning Co-Responsibility in Cabinet Decisions

Ilana Shpaizman, Amnon Cavari

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

3 Scopus citations


In coalition governments, parties invest much effort to manage delegation costs to individual ministers. In this article, we examine an intra-executive mechanism for managing delegation costs: Assigning ministerial co-responsibility in cabinet decisions. Using data of cabinet decisions in Israel, we test when and under what conditions co-responsibility is assigned. We find that co-responsibility is assigned strategically by cabinet members weighing the risk of a drift against the costs of imposing co-responsibility. These findings demonstrate an understudied mechanism through which coalition governments narrow ministerial autonomy and informational advantage once policies reach the cabinet. In doing so, this research contributes to a better understanding of policymaking in coalition governments.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1760-1789
Number of pages30
JournalComparative Political Studies
Issue number11
StatePublished - Sep 2023

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© The Author(s) 2023.


  • cabinet
  • cabinet ministers
  • coalition government


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