Military power and foreign policy inaction: Israel, 1967‒1973

Moshe Gat

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    Abstract

    Between 1967 and 1973, Israeli governments took no initiative to set a peace process in motion. Instead, they simply responded to proposals that were raised from time to time, and, for the most part, rejected all of them – the Rogers Plan, Sadat’s willingness to sign a peace agreement and his initiative for an interim settlement – with the sole exception being the ceasefire agreement reached in August 1970. While Israeli policy lacked initiative on the political front, it dedicated much effort to convincing the United States that the greater Israel’s military power, the better its deterrence capabilities would be, which in turn would increase the likelihood of achieving peace. Hence, Israeli leaders’ repeated requests to be supplied with advanced aircraft.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)69-95
    Number of pages27
    JournalIsrael Affairs
    Volume22
    Issue number1
    DOIs
    StatePublished - 2 Jan 2016

    Bibliographical note

    Publisher Copyright:
    © 2016 Taylor & Francis.

    Keywords

    • Anwar Sadat
    • Egypt
    • Israel
    • Meir Golda
    • Rogers Plan
    • peace process

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