Metaphor and consciousness: The path less taken

In attempting to achieve some form of mapping between consciousness (specifically, consciousness₆) and cognition, I distinguish between a weak and a strong version of the hypothesis, indicating a change in mode of thinking of a metaphoric-symbolic nature (Glicksohn, 1993). The weak version would claim that metaphors, symbols, analogies and images are used in an attempt to depict the experience, which is not easily translatable into words. The strong version would claim that metaphoric thinking is one of the hallmarks of the experience, and is used both in an attempt to depict the experience and also to convey to the reader, and possibly to induce in the reader, some of the qualities of that experience. My discussion of these two options is preceded by some comments on problems inherent in studying altered or alternate states of consciousness. I also discuss the relationships among physiognomic perception, cognitive dedifferentiation, and symbolic cognition.