TY - GEN
T1 - Matching with couples revisited
AU - Ashlagi, Itai
AU - Braverman, Mark
AU - Hassidim, Avinatan
N1 - Place of conference:USA
PY - 2011
Y1 - 2011
N2 - It is well known that a stable matching in a many-to-one matching market with couples need not exist. We introduce a new matching algorithm for such markets and show that for large random markets the algorithm will find a stable matching with high probability. In our model we allow the number of couples to grow at a near-linear rate. Furthermore, truth-telling is an approximated equilibrium in the game induced by the new matching algorithm. Our results are tight: for markets in which the number of couples grows at a linear rate, we show that with constant probability no stable matching exists.
AB - It is well known that a stable matching in a many-to-one matching market with couples need not exist. We introduce a new matching algorithm for such markets and show that for large random markets the algorithm will find a stable matching with high probability. In our model we allow the number of couples to grow at a near-linear rate. Furthermore, truth-telling is an approximated equilibrium in the game induced by the new matching algorithm. Our results are tight: for markets in which the number of couples grows at a linear rate, we show that with constant probability no stable matching exists.
KW - market design
KW - matching
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=79959609897&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1145/1993574.1993628
DO - 10.1145/1993574.1993628
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AN - SCOPUS:79959609897
SN - 9781450302616
T3 - Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
SP - 335
BT - EC'11 - Proceedings of the 12th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
T2 - 12th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC'11
Y2 - 5 June 2011 through 9 June 2011
ER -