Matching behavior and collective action. Some experimental evidence

Joel M. Guttman

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

32 Scopus citations


A new approach to explaining voluntary collective action, emphasizing strategic interactions of actors in their contributions to the provision of a public good, is tested experimentally. The results support this approach, and tend to reject the conventional, Cournot theory of the provision of public goods. Among the findings are a positive interaction between individual contributions to the provision of a public good, and a U-shaped time trend in combined contributions.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)171-198
Number of pages28
JournalJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Issue number2
StatePublished - Jun 1986

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
*I am indebted to L. Putterman and anonymous referees for helpful comments and discussions, and to B. Asch, I. Maoz, H. Salehi, and R. Sousa, for valuable research assistance. The experiments reported here were performed at the Center for Computer-Based Behavioral Studies at the University of California, Los Angeles; I wish to thank G. Shure, M. Rogers, and the staff of the Center for their assistance. This research was funded by internal research grants from UCLA and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and by the Israel Foundation Trustees of the Ford Foundation.


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