Making inconsistency respectable: A logical framework for inconsistency in reasoning, Part I - A position paper

Dov Gabbay; Anthony Hunter

doi:10.1007/3-540-54507-7_3

Making inconsistency respectable: A logical framework for inconsistency in reasoning, Part I - A position paper

Dov Gabbay, Anthony Hunter

Imperial College London

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

84 Scopus citations

Abstract

We claim there is a fundamental difference between the way humans handle inconsistency and the way it is currently handled in formal logical systems: To a human, resolving inconsistencies is not necessarily done by “restoring” consistency but by supplying rules telling one how to act when the inconsistency arises. For artificial intelligence there is an urgent need to revise the view that inconsistency is a ‘bad’ thing, and instead view it as mostly a ‘good’ thing. Inconsistencies can be read as signals to take external action, such as ‘ask the user,' or invoke a ‘truth maintenance system’, or as signals for internal actions that activate some rules and deactivate other rules. There is a need to develop a framework in which inconsistency can be viewed according to context, as a vital trigger for actions, for learning and as an important source of direction in argumentation.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Fundamentals of Artificial Intelligence Research - International Workshop FAIR 1991, Proceedings
Editors	Jozef Kelemen, Philippe Jorrand
Publisher	Springer Verlag
Pages	19-32
Number of pages	14
ISBN (Print)	9783540545071
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-54507-7_3
State	Published - 1991
Externally published	Yes
Event	International Workshop on Fundamentals of Artificial Intelligence Research, FAIR 1991 - Smolenice, Slovakia Duration: 8 Sep 1991 → 13 Sep 1991

Publication series

Name	Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume	535 LNAI
ISSN (Print)	0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)	1611-3349

Conference

Conference	International Workshop on Fundamentals of Artificial Intelligence Research, FAIR 1991
Country/Territory	Slovakia
City	Smolenice
Period	8/09/91 → 13/09/91

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1991.

Funding

This work is supported by SERC to Lydia Rivlin, Ruth Kempson, short notice.

Funders	Funder number
Science and Engineering Research Council

Access to Document

10.1007/3-540-54507-7_3

Cite this

Gabbay, D., & Hunter, A. (1991). Making inconsistency respectable: A logical framework for inconsistency in reasoning, Part I - A position paper. In J. Kelemen, & P. Jorrand (Eds.), Fundamentals of Artificial Intelligence Research - International Workshop FAIR 1991, Proceedings (pp. 19-32). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 535 LNAI). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-54507-7_3

Gabbay, Dov ; Hunter, Anthony. / Making inconsistency respectable : A logical framework for inconsistency in reasoning, Part I - A position paper. Fundamentals of Artificial Intelligence Research - International Workshop FAIR 1991, Proceedings. editor / Jozef Kelemen ; Philippe Jorrand. Springer Verlag, 1991. pp. 19-32 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)).

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Gabbay, D & Hunter, A 1991, Making inconsistency respectable: A logical framework for inconsistency in reasoning, Part I - A position paper. in J Kelemen & P Jorrand (eds), Fundamentals of Artificial Intelligence Research - International Workshop FAIR 1991, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 535 LNAI, Springer Verlag, pp. 19-32, International Workshop on Fundamentals of Artificial Intelligence Research, FAIR 1991, Smolenice, Slovakia, 8/09/91. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-54507-7_3

Making inconsistency respectable: A logical framework for inconsistency in reasoning, Part I - A position paper. / Gabbay, Dov; Hunter, Anthony.
Fundamentals of Artificial Intelligence Research - International Workshop FAIR 1991, Proceedings. ed. / Jozef Kelemen; Philippe Jorrand. Springer Verlag, 1991. p. 19-32 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 535 LNAI).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

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Gabbay D, Hunter A. Making inconsistency respectable: A logical framework for inconsistency in reasoning, Part I - A position paper. In Kelemen J, Jorrand P, editors, Fundamentals of Artificial Intelligence Research - International Workshop FAIR 1991, Proceedings. Springer Verlag. 1991. p. 19-32. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)). doi: 10.1007/3-540-54507-7_3

Making inconsistency respectable: A logical framework for inconsistency in reasoning, Part I - A position paper

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