Maimonides on Opinion and Knowledge: What can non-intellectual uses of deᶜot in Hebrew translations of the Guide teach us about Maimonides' epistemology?

Maimonides' use of the Hebrew deᶜot in the Mishneh Torah is ambiguous; it can refer to intellectual knowledge, opinions, or moral habits. Hebrew translators of the Guide, including Samuel ibn Tibbon and Judah al-Ḥarizi, sought to dispel some of this ambiguity by using the Hebrew term sekhel exclusively to mean “intellect.” Yet they did use deᶜot to translate the Arabic ᵓārāᵓ, “views” or “opinions.” Probably because of Maimonides's intellectual use of deᶜot in the Mishneh Torah, al-Ḥarizi only uses the term when it is clear that Maimonides has in mind true opinions; elsewhere he uses the terms sebarot or maḥashavot. Ibn Tibbon, however, always uses deᶜot for “opinions.” Maimonides himself recommended to Ibn Tibbon to use the Hebrew term madaᶜot for ᵓārāᵓ, “opinions,” and Ibn Tibbon's reluctance to follow Maimonides in this underlines the importance of the term deᶜot for Ibn Tibbon's understanding of Maimonides. By examining Ibn Tibbon's translations of certain chapters of the Guide in which deᶜot play a central role, e.g., I 31-32, III 36 and III 51, I will argue that Ibn Tibbon strives to preserve some of the range of meanings Maimonides assigned to deᶜot in the Mishneh Torah in the translation of the Guide. In particular, Ibn Tibbon strives to preserve the possibility that opinions and moral habits (both called deᶜot) can lead to intellect. This conclusion is important for Maimonides' conception of popular religion and for the possibility that true opinions can lead to intellect.