LR-OT: Leakage-Resilient Oblivious Transfer

Francesco Berti; Carmit Hazay; Itamar Levi

doi:10.1007/978-3-031-71070-4_9

LR-OT: Leakage-Resilient Oblivious Transfer

Francesco Berti, Carmit Hazay, Itamar Levi

Bar-Ilan University

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

Abstract

Oblivious Transfer (OT) is a fundamental cryptographic primitive, becoming a crucial component of a practical secure protocol. OT is typically implemented in software, and one way to accelerate its running time is by using hardware implementations. However, such implementations are vulnerable to side-channel attacks (SCAs). On the other hand, protecting interactive protocols against SCA is highly challenging because of their longer secrets (which include inputs and randomness), more complicated design, and running multiple instances. Consequently, there are no truly practical leakage-resistant OT protocols yet. In this paper, we introduce two tailored indistinguishability-based security definitions for leakage-resilient OT, focusing on protecting the sender’s state. Second, we propose a practical semi-honest secure OT protocol that achieves these security levels while minimizing the assumptions on the protocol’s building blocks and the use of a secret state. Finally, we extend our protocol to support sequential composition and explore efficiency-security tradeoffs.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Security and Cryptography for Networks - 14th International Conference, SCN 2024, Proceedings
Editors	Clemente Galdi, Duong Hieu Phan
Publisher	Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH
Pages	182-204
Number of pages	23
ISBN (Print)	9783031710698
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-71070-4_9
State	Published - 2024
Event	14th Conference on Security and Cryptography for Networks, SCN 2024 - Amalfi, Italy Duration: 11 Sep 2024 → 13 Sep 2024

Publication series

Name	Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume	14973 LNCS
ISSN (Print)	0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)	1611-3349

Conference

Conference	14th Conference on Security and Cryptography for Networks, SCN 2024
Country/Territory	Italy
City	Amalfi
Period	11/09/24 → 13/09/24

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024.

Access to Document

10.1007/978-3-031-71070-4_9

Cite this

Berti, F., Hazay, C., & Levi, I. (2024). LR-OT: Leakage-Resilient Oblivious Transfer. In C. Galdi, & D. H. Phan (Eds.), Security and Cryptography for Networks - 14th International Conference, SCN 2024, Proceedings (pp. 182-204). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 14973 LNCS). Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-71070-4_9

Berti, Francesco ; Hazay, Carmit ; Levi, Itamar. / LR-OT : Leakage-Resilient Oblivious Transfer. Security and Cryptography for Networks - 14th International Conference, SCN 2024, Proceedings. editor / Clemente Galdi ; Duong Hieu Phan. Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH, 2024. pp. 182-204 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)).

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abstract = "Oblivious Transfer (OT) is a fundamental cryptographic primitive, becoming a crucial component of a practical secure protocol. OT is typically implemented in software, and one way to accelerate its running time is by using hardware implementations. However, such implementations are vulnerable to side-channel attacks (SCAs). On the other hand, protecting interactive protocols against SCA is highly challenging because of their longer secrets (which include inputs and randomness), more complicated design, and running multiple instances. Consequently, there are no truly practical leakage-resistant OT protocols yet. In this paper, we introduce two tailored indistinguishability-based security definitions for leakage-resilient OT, focusing on protecting the sender{\textquoteright}s state. Second, we propose a practical semi-honest secure OT protocol that achieves these security levels while minimizing the assumptions on the protocol{\textquoteright}s building blocks and the use of a secret state. Finally, we extend our protocol to support sequential composition and explore efficiency-security tradeoffs.",

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Berti, F, Hazay, C & Levi, I 2024, LR-OT: Leakage-Resilient Oblivious Transfer. in C Galdi & DH Phan (eds), Security and Cryptography for Networks - 14th International Conference, SCN 2024, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 14973 LNCS, Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH, pp. 182-204, 14th Conference on Security and Cryptography for Networks, SCN 2024, Amalfi, Italy, 11/09/24. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-71070-4_9

LR-OT: Leakage-Resilient Oblivious Transfer. / Berti, Francesco; Hazay, Carmit ; Levi, Itamar.
Security and Cryptography for Networks - 14th International Conference, SCN 2024, Proceedings. ed. / Clemente Galdi; Duong Hieu Phan. Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH, 2024. p. 182-204 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 14973 LNCS).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

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Berti F, Hazay C , Levi I. LR-OT: Leakage-Resilient Oblivious Transfer. In Galdi C, Phan DH, editors, Security and Cryptography for Networks - 14th International Conference, SCN 2024, Proceedings. Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH. 2024. p. 182-204. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)). doi: 10.1007/978-3-031-71070-4_9

LR-OT: Leakage-Resilient Oblivious Transfer

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