TY - GEN
T1 - Local computation mechanism design
AU - Hassidim, Avinatan
AU - Mansour, Yishay
AU - Vardi, Shai
N1 - Place of conference:USA
PY - 2014
Y1 - 2014
N2 - We introduce the notion of local computation mechanism design - designing game theoretic mechanisms that run in polylogarithmic time and space. Local computation mechanisms reply to each query in polylogarithmic time and space, and the replies to different queries are consistent with the same global feasible solution. When the mechanism employs payments, the computation of the payments is also done in polylogarithmic time and space. Furthermore, the mechanism needs to maintain incentive compatibility with respect to the allocation and payments. We present local computation mechanisms for a variety of classical game-theoretical problems: (1) stable matching, (2) job scheduling, (3) combinatorial auctions for unit-demand and k-minded bidders, and (4) the housing allocation problem. For stable matching, some of our techniques may have implications to the global (non-LCA) setting. Specifically, we show that when the men's preference lists are bounded, we can achieve an arbitrarily good approximation to the stable matching within a fixed number of iterations of the Gale-Shapley algorithm.
AB - We introduce the notion of local computation mechanism design - designing game theoretic mechanisms that run in polylogarithmic time and space. Local computation mechanisms reply to each query in polylogarithmic time and space, and the replies to different queries are consistent with the same global feasible solution. When the mechanism employs payments, the computation of the payments is also done in polylogarithmic time and space. Furthermore, the mechanism needs to maintain incentive compatibility with respect to the allocation and payments. We present local computation mechanisms for a variety of classical game-theoretical problems: (1) stable matching, (2) job scheduling, (3) combinatorial auctions for unit-demand and k-minded bidders, and (4) the housing allocation problem. For stable matching, some of our techniques may have implications to the global (non-LCA) setting. Specifically, we show that when the men's preference lists are bounded, we can achieve an arbitrarily good approximation to the stable matching within a fixed number of iterations of the Gale-Shapley algorithm.
KW - local computation algorithms
KW - mechanism design
KW - stable matching
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84903212363&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1145/2600057.2602839
DO - 10.1145/2600057.2602839
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AN - SCOPUS:84903212363
SN - 9781450325653
T3 - EC 2014 - Proceedings of the 15th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
SP - 601
EP - 615
BT - EC 2014 - Proceedings of the 15th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
PB - Association for Computing Machinery
T2 - 15th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC 2014
Y2 - 8 June 2014 through 12 June 2014
ER -