Lobbying contests with alternative instruments

Gil S. Epstein, Carsten Hefeker

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

28 Scopus citations


This is a model of a contest where, in order to win, each opponent can use two instruments. The probabilities of winning are explored, as well as the expenditures of the interest groups, and the relative rent-dissipation in both cases where the players have the option to use only one instrument (the standard Tullock contest) and where the players have the option to use two instruments in the contest. We show that the use of two instruments strengthens the player with the higher stake, decreases the relative rent dissipation and it decreases total expenditure if the parties are sufficiently asymmetric.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)81-89
Number of pages9
JournalEconomics of Governance
Issue number1
StatePublished - 2003


  • Lobbying
  • Rent-dissipation
  • Rent-seeking


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