Lobbying and concessions: Comparing Nash to Stackelberg games

Gil S. Epstein; Carsten Hefeker

doi:10.1023/A:1012060010988

Lobbying and concessions: Comparing Nash to Stackelberg games

Gil S. Epstein, Carsten Hefeker

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

We analyze how the standard results in lobbying theory change when one side has a second instrument at its disposal. We look at the effect concessions by one side have on the outcome in a Nash and a Stackelberg game.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	175-181
Number of pages	7
Journal	Public Choice
Volume	109
Issue number	1-2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1012060010988
State	Published - 2001
Externally published	Yes

Access to Document

10.1023/A:1012060010988

Cite this

@article{d2c7c92917fa488f85785e6e2da56643,

title = "Lobbying and concessions: Comparing Nash to Stackelberg games",

abstract = "We analyze how the standard results in lobbying theory change when one side has a second instrument at its disposal. We look at the effect concessions by one side have on the outcome in a Nash and a Stackelberg game.",

author = "Epstein, {Gil S.} and Carsten Hefeker",

year = "2001",

doi = "10.1023/A:1012060010988",

language = "אנגלית",

volume = "109",

pages = "175--181",

journal = "Public Choice",

issn = "0048-5829",

publisher = "Springer Netherlands",

number = "1-2",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Lobbying and concessions

T2 - Comparing Nash to Stackelberg games

AU - Epstein, Gil S.

AU - Hefeker, Carsten

PY - 2001

Y1 - 2001

N2 - We analyze how the standard results in lobbying theory change when one side has a second instrument at its disposal. We look at the effect concessions by one side have on the outcome in a Nash and a Stackelberg game.

AB - We analyze how the standard results in lobbying theory change when one side has a second instrument at its disposal. We look at the effect concessions by one side have on the outcome in a Nash and a Stackelberg game.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0035604155&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1023/A:1012060010988

DO - 10.1023/A:1012060010988

M3 - ???researchoutput.researchoutputtypes.contributiontojournal.article???

AN - SCOPUS:0035604155

SN - 0048-5829

VL - 109

SP - 175

EP - 181

JO - Public Choice

JF - Public Choice

IS - 1-2

ER -

Lobbying and concessions: Comparing Nash to Stackelberg games

Abstract

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this